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Showing posts with label Afghanistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Afghanistan. Show all posts

Monday, June 24, 2013

As troops pull out of Afghanistan, Afghans rush to learn how to defuse bombs.

Afghans rush to learn risky art of defusing bombs ahead of troop pullout

  • afghanistan_bomb_defusal_training.jpg
    June 11, 2013: Afghan solider Naqibullah Qarizada hunches over a knee-high robot armed with cameras attaching four bottles of water and a tiny explosive charge to defuse a mine during an IED defusing training exercise on the outskirts of Kabul, Afghanistan. A few years ago, there were almost no Afghan bomb disposal experts. Now, there are 369 -- and the international coalition is rushing to train hundreds more before the exit of most coalition forces by the end of next year. (AP)


In a desolate field outside Kabul, an Afghan soldier hunches over a knee-high robot equipped with cameras, multidirectional pincers and tank-treads built for rough terrain. Carefully, he attaches four bottles of water and a tiny explosive charge to the robot. He uses a remote control to guide it yards away to his target: a simulated backpack bomb.

"Explosion! Explosion! Explosion!" shouts the soldier, Naqibullah Qarizada, in a warning to others nearby. Then he remotely detonates the charge.

A small dust cloud kicks up. If all has gone well, the blast has pushed the water into the bomb with enough force to knock out its triggering mechanism. But to be safe, his partner, Hayatullah, climbs into a heavy protective suit before lumbering over to pluck out the blasting cap and seal it in a fortified box.

The two men are among hundreds of Afghan soldiers training to take over the dangerous fight against the war's biggest killers: the Taliban-planted bombs known as IEDs that kill and maim thousands of people each year on and around the country's roads and towns.

A few years ago, there were almost no Afghan bomb disposal experts. Now, there are 369 — but that's far from enough. The international coalition is rushing to train hundreds more before the exit of most coalition forces by the end of next year.

Each day on average, two to three roadside or buried bombs explode somewhere in Afghanistan, according to numbers compiled by the United Nations, which says that the explosives killed 868 civilians last year, 40 percent of the civilian deaths in insurgent attacks. Among international forces, buried or roadside bombs accounted for 64 percent of the 3,300 coalition troops killed or wounded last year, the NATO force says.

Known in military parlance as improvised explosives devices (IEDs), the bombs have long been a favorite Taliban weapon that can be remotely detonated by radio or mobile phone when a target passes by or triggered by pressure, like a vehicle driving over it.

The U.S. military has over the years developed advanced detection and disposal techniques that manage to defuse about 40 to 50 IEDs each day, says Col. Ace Campbell, chief of the Counter-IED training unit. The coalition is working to transfer that knowledge to the Afghans who will be responsible once most foreign troops leave next year, and Campbell says Afghan teams are now finding and disposing about half of the bombs most days.

"Whenever I hear about an IED or I find one myself — maybe you will laugh, but I become very happy," says Hayatullah, 28, who has completed the highest level of training and like many Afghans uses just one name. "I am happy because it is my duty to defuse it, and I will save the lives of several people."

Hayatullah also has a personal reason for his chosen profession — his father was killed in a mine explosion. He was just 13 when unknown attackers planted two anti-personnel mines outside their home in Parwan province, and he says the memory fuels his desire to save others.

The country's main bomb disposal school is located at Camp Black Horse, set among a dust-swept field on Kabul's eastern outskirts, where a rusted-out Russian tank looms on a distant hill, a reminder of Afghanistan's long legacy of war dating back to the 1980s Soviet occupation.

Here, a team of about 160 instructors runs 19 different courses, ranging from a basic four-week awareness program for regular Afghan soldiers to the eight-month advanced "IED defeat" course that is a slightly shorter version of the U.S. Army's own counter-explosives training.

"We are giving them the best instruction that we have available, and they are picking it up," said U.S. Army Maj. Joel Smith, one of the training program's leaders. "Some are getting killed, some are dropping out, but their numbers are growing."

Still, it is a race against time to produce enough experts to fill the gap left by foreign troops' withdrawal. On Tuesday, NATO formally handed over full security responsibility to Afghanistan's fledgling 350,000-strong security forces, though many of the remaining foreign troops will stay until next year in a support and training role.

The goal is to have 318 full-fledged Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams, each with two or three Afghan experts, spread out around the country. But Afghan security forces now have less than 60 percent of the bomb specialists they need — hence the fever pitch of training.

"These guys are on a more accelerated program due to necessity," Smith said.

Equipping the Afghan teams is also a challenge. The coalition plans to distribute 12,000 metal detectors to regular police and army units, and each of the specialized disposal teams is slated to receive one of the high-tech robots that Qarizada and Hayatullah were working with. But Smith said each of the robots costs $17,000, and so far only about half of those needed are in the hands of Afghan teams. And that is not even taking into account who will maintain the sophisticated machines in a country where dust clogs nearly every machine and technical expertise is scarce.

Bomb disposal units gained widespread fame with the 2008 film "The Hurt Locker," but in real life the process — while still dangerous — is much slower and more methodical. The ultimate goal is to try not to approach a live bomb until it's been neutralized, which is the point of the exercise with the robot and the protective suit.

But with thousands of buried bombs and more being planted every day, it's impossible to have such sophisticated tools everywhere. That's why the program also trains regular Afghan army and police for four weeks in how to recognize signs of a smaller IED — freshly moved earth, or perhaps a conveniently placed culvert next to a bridge — and neutralize it in the crudest but simplest way: setting a smaller charge, moving far, far away and blowing it up in place.


Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/06/23/afghans-rush-to-learn-risky-art-defusing-bombs-ahead-troop-pullout/#ixzz2XAKOlzmT

Sunday, February 3, 2013

Chris Kyle, Author of "American Sniper", Shot Dead at Texas Firing Range

‘American Sniper’ author Chris Kyle shot dead at Texas gun range; ex-Navy SEAL was 38
By Jessica Chasmar



Photo by: Paul Moseley
Chris Kyle, a former Navy SEAL who wrote the book “American Sniper,” poses in Midlothian, Texas, on Friday, April 6, 2012. (AP Photo/The Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Paul Moseley)



A 25-year-old man was charged Sunday in the deadly shooting of Chris Kyle, a former Navy SEAL who was the author of “American Sniper,” and another man at a Texas firing range.

Sgt. Lonny Haschel said in a news release that deputies responded to a shooting at the Rough Creek Lodge outside Glen Rose, Texas, about 50 miles from Fort Worth, at about 5:30 p.m. Saturday. Police found the bodies of Mr. Kyle, 38, and Chad Littlefield, 35, at the shooting range, the Associated Press reports.

Eddie Ray Routh of Lancaster, Texas, was arraigned on two counts of capital murder. The motive for the shooting was unclear.


Mr. Kyle wrote the best-selling book “American Sniper: The Autobiography of the Most Lethal Sniper in U.S. Military History.” A news release from Travis Cox, director of FITCO Cares, a nonprofit Mr. Kyle helped start, said Mr. Kyle served four tours of duty, the AP reports.

Read more: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/3/american-sniper-author-chris-kyle-shot-dead-texas-/?utm_source=RSS_Feed&utm_medium=RSS#ixzz2Jrl2Pt5q
Follow us: @washtimes on Twitter




‘American Sniper’ Author Shot to Death in Texas



Wednesday, January 23, 2013

Peace In Our Time? Appeasement? Obama's Inaugural Address.

President Obama's use of the phrase "peace in our time," often ascribed to Neville Chamberlain, in his second inaugural address has caused something of a stir, as PJ Media points out. It has made people wonder if Obama is embracing appeasement. ~ VOICES
If you did not already know that the President has no grasp of history, no knowledge of what he is saying, this should help confirm it.
According to the transcript released by the White House, President Obama channeled Neville Chamberlain, using the phrase "peace in our time" to tout his reelection.
The President explained (emphasis mine):


We will support democracy from Asia to Africa, from the Americas to the Middle East, because our interests and our conscience compel us to act on behalf of those who long for freedom. And we must be a source of hope to the poor, the sick, the marginalized, the victims of prejudice. Not out of mere charity, but because peace in our time requires the constant advance of those principles that our common creed describes.
As you certainly remember, the short-sighted Prime Minister of Great Britain, Neville Chamberlain promised the very same thing, just a single year before the most destructive war in history ripped Europe to sunders. ~FREE REPUBLIC

This short video clip will show you what happens when you do appeasement with evil dictators! 





OBAMA: 'PEACE IN OUR TIME'


It was either an embarrassing slip, or a frightening revelation of the president’s true worldview. Either way, the words “peace in our time,” made infamous by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain as he promised an illusory peace with Adolf Hitler in 1938, should never have been in President Barack Obama’s second inaugural address. Yet they were, and went virtually unnoticed until caught by conservatives on social media.

The phrase appeared in a passage on foreign policy, in which the president pledged to defend the nation while resolving differences peacefully [emphasis added]: 
And we must be a source of hope to the poor, the sick, the marginalized, the victims of prejudice--not out of mere charity, but because peace in our time requires the constant advance of those principles that our common creed describes: tolerance and opportunity; human dignity and justice.
The sentence is rather tortured, but the idea seems to be that promoting socioeconomic equality around the world can help prevent conflict. It echoes the “root causes” theory of terrorism, which is that poverty produces extremism or at least provides it fertile ground There is some truth to that, although many terrorists come from middle class origins, and target America precisely because it symbolizes the values the president described.
Regardless, the reason Chamberlain’s “peace in our time” is remembered is not that his theory of international relations was wrong but because he was hopelessly, dangerously naïve about Hitler’s intentions. A year after Chamberlain waved the paper on which he had signed the Munich Agreement, ceding the sovereignty of Czechosolvakia in return for Hitler’s promises of peace, Germany had invaded Poland and Britain was at war.
President Obama shows similar naïveté, or hubris, about the war against international terrorism. “A decade of war is now ending,” he declared, even as a new front has opened in the war against Al Qaeda in Africa. He--ironically--failed to mention Afghanistan, where soldiers still fight and die in a cause President Obama has all but abandoned, and where America has already once suffered the brutal consequences of neglect.
Like Chamberlain, the president seems to believe in negotiation as an end in itself. He spent his first term seeking an elusive nuclear agreement with the Iranian regime, even permitting it to recover from a near-revolution in 2009, convinced that its assurances of peaceful intentions would be enough. He backed away from promises of missile defense to Poland and the Czech Republic--receiving nothing from Russia in return.
When Republicans called President Obama’s approach “appeasement,” he responded angrily: “Ask Osama bin Laden...whether I engage in appeasement.” Yet Obama has been trying to negotiate with the Taliban who once sheltered bin Laden and Al Qaeda, in an attempt to put a brave face on withdrawal. And Al Qaeda’s attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions in the Middle East on Sep. 11, 2012 suggest that it has not been deterred.
The president intends to continue pulling back. His nominees to foreign policy posts--John Kerry (State), Chuck Hagel (Defense), and John Brennan (CIA)--each share his vision of a humbler America. He pretends the alternative to his approach is “perpetual war.” But Ronald Reagan showed the merit of “peace through strength,” challenging Soviet aggression, standing up to terror and letting dissidents know they were not alone.
President Obama has shown a very selective interest in history, narrowly focused on the sites of civil rights struggles--Osawatomie, for example, and the three sites mentioned in his address. Beyond that familiar subject, he shows little sensitivity or expertise: he once flubbed the date of the Constitutional Convention, for example, and pulled out of the missile defense deal on the 60th anniversary of the Russian invasion of Poland.
History remembers Chamberlain’s “peace in our time” as the definitive statement of appeasement, which is precisely why its use in the president’s inaugural address is so odd, and ominous. It is possible that it was simply the error of a young speechwriter. But the White House boasted that the president had written early drafts of his address. And his policies suggest that “peace in our time” is indeed, despite history, close to his heart.





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Thursday, October 18, 2012

Libya Suspects Islamist Group In Consulate Attack As U.S. Prepares Retaliation


Posted By Mary Casey, Jennifer Parker     Share

Libyan authorities have said they suspect Ahmed Abu Khattala, the leader of Libya's Islamist militant group Ansar al-Sharia, to have led the September 11 attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi. Witnesses have reported seeing Abu Khattala at the site, but his exact role is unclear, as is whether or not he shared leadership with others. But, the allegations provide the most direct link yet between Ansar al-Sharia and the assault. The F.B.I. has been investigating the attack from Tripoli, almost 400 miles from Benghazi, and a U.S. official said they had been tracking Abu Khattala who remains at large. Having not yet established central control of security since last year's revolution, Libyan authorities rely on local militias for law enforcement. The government-allied militias say that haven't been directed to arrest Abu Khattala, and the government is concerned about exacerbating tensions between rival militia groups.
Syria
Syrian human rights groups say that at least 28,000 people have "disappeared" in Syria since the beginning of the 19-month long uprising, and some estimate the number of missing to be as high as 80,000. According to a director at the online activist group Avazza, "Syrians are being plucked off the street by Syrian security forces and paramilitaries and being ‘disappeared' into torture cells. Whether it is women buying groceries or farmers going for fuel, nobody is safe." The group plans to request an investigation by the U.N. Human Rights Council. Damascus has started to feel the strain of the country's civil war, from which  it had been relatively isolated until recently. Meanwhile, U.N. and Arab League envoy to Syria, Lahkdar Brahimi, has warned of regional spillover of the conflict. After meeting with Lebanese officials seeking international support for a ceasefire over an upcoming holiday, which Turkey and Iran have backed, he said, "The crisis cannot remain within Syrian borders indefinitely. Either it will be addressed or it will increase ... and be all-consuming." Brahimi's remarks came shortly before reports of Syrian and Lebanese border clashes.

US Consulate attack in Benghazi: America ponders a strike over Libya attack
The White House, under political pressure to respond forcefully to the Sept. 11 attack on the U.S. Consulate inBenghazi, is readying strike forces and drones but first has to find a target.

And if the administration does find a target, officials say it still has to weigh whether the short-term payoff of exacting retribution on al-Qaida is worth the risk that such strikes could elevate the group's profile in the region, alienate governments the U.S. needs to fight the group in the future and do little to slow the growing terror threat in North Africa.

Details on the administration's position and on its search for a possible target were provided by three current and one former administration official, as well as an analyst who was approached by the White House for help. All four spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the high-level debates publicly.

In another effort to bolster Libyan security, the Pentagon and State Department have been developing a plan to train and equip a special operations force in Libya, according to a senior defense official.

The efforts show the tension of the White House's need to demonstrate it is responding forcefully to al-Qaida, balanced against its long-term plans to develop relationships and trust with local governments and build a permanent U.S. counterterrorist network in the region.
Vice President Joe Biden pledged in his debate last week with Republican vice presidential nominee Paul Ryan to find those responsible for the Sept. 11 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi that killed U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens and three others.

"We will find and bring to justice the men who did this," Biden said in response to a question about whether intelligence failures led to lax security around Stevens and the consulate. Referring back to the raid that killed Osama bin Laden last year, Biden said American counterterror policy should be, "if you do harm to America, we will track you to the gates of hell if need be."

The White House declined to comment on the debate over how best to respond to the Benghazi attack.

The attack has become an issue in the U.S. election season, with Republicans accusing the Obama administration of being slow to label the assault an act of terrorism and slow to strike back at those responsible. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said Monday night that the security of State Department operations was her responsibility.

The White House is "aiming for a small pop, a flash in the pan, so as to be able to say, 'Hey, we're doing something about it,'" said retired Air Force Lt. Col. Rudy Attalah, the former Africa counterterrorism director for Defense Department under President George W. Bush.
US consulate in Benghazi was attacked over anti-Islam film
US consulate in Benghazi was attacked over anti-Islam film in September 2012.
Attalah noted that in 1998, after the embassy bombing in Nairobi, the Clinton administration fired cruise missiles to take out a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan that may have been producing chemical weapons for al-Qaida.

"It was a way to say, 'Look, we did something,'" he said.

On the subject of developing a special operations unit, U.S. officials received approval from Congress well before the Benghazi attack to reprogram some funding in the budget that could be used for the commando program in Libya. But the details are still being discussed with the Libyans and also must get final approval from Congress, according to the defense official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the matter publicly.
The initial cost is estimated at about $6.2 million.

The defense official said U.S. leaders have recognized the need to train Libyan commando forces, but details such as the size, mission and composition of the forces are still being finalized.

A Washington-based analyst with extensive experience in Africa said administration officials have approached him for help in connecting the dots to Mali, whose northern half fell to al-Qaida-linked rebels this spring. They wanted to know if he could suggest potential targets, which he says he was not able to do.

"The civilian side is looking into doing something and is running into a lot of pushback from the military side," the analyst said. "The resistance that is coming from the military side is because the military has both worked in the region and trained in the region. So they are more realistic."

Islamists in the region are preparing for a reaction from the U.S.

Possible US Attack in Libya Faces Opposition

The United States consulate in Benghazi, Libya is seen in flames during an attack that killed four U.S. staffers, including Ambassador Christopher Stevens on September 11, 2012.

White House reportedly preps strike team to take out terrorists tied to Libya attack



The White House has put special operations strike forces on standby and moved drones into the skies above Africa, ready to strike militant targets from Libya to Mali — if investigators can find the Al Qaeda-linked group responsible for the death of the U.S. ambassador and three other Americans in Libya.

But officials say the administration, with weeks until the presidential election, is weighing whether the short-term payoff of exacting retribution on Al Qaeda is worth the risk that such strikes could elevate the group's profile in the region, alienate governments the U.S. needs to fight it in the future and do little to slow the growing terror threat in North Africa.

Details on the administration's position and on its search for a possible target were provided by three current and one former administration official, as well as an analyst who was approached by the White House for help. All four spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the high-level debates publicly.

The dilemma shows the tension of the White House's need to demonstrate it is responding forcefully to Al Qaeda, balanced against its long-term plans to develop relationships and trust with local governments and build a permanent U.S. counterterrorist network in the region.

Vice President Joe Biden pledged in his debate last week with Republican vice presidential nominee Paul Ryan to find those responsible for the Sept. 11 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi that killed Ambassador Chris Stevens and three others.
"We will find and bring to justice the men who did this," Biden said in response to a question about whether intelligence failures led to lax security around Stevens and the consulate. Referring back to the raid that killed Osama bin Laden last year, Biden said American counterterror policy should be, "if you do harm to America, we will track you to the gates of hell if need be."

The White House declined to comment on the debate over how best to respond to the Benghazi attack.

The attack has become an issue in the U.S. election season, with Republicans accusing the Obama administration of being slow to label the assault an act of terrorism early on, and slow to strike back at those responsible.

"They are aiming for a small pop, a flash in the pan, so as to be able to say, 'Hey, we're doing something about it,'" said retired Air Force Lt. Col. Rudy Attalah, the former Africa counterterrorism director for the Department of Defense under President George W. Bush.

Attalah noted that in 1998, after the embassy bombing in Nairobi, the Clinton administration fired cruise missiles to take out a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan that may have been producing chemical weapons for Al Qaeda.
"It was a way to say, 'Look, we did something,'" he said.

A Washington-based analyst with extensive experience in Africa said that administration officials have approached him asking for help in connecting the dots to Mali, whose northern half fell to Al Qaeda-linked rebels this spring. They wanted to know if he could suggest potential targets, which he says he was not able to do.

"The civilian side is looking into doing something, and is running into a lot of pushback from the military side," the analyst said. "The resistance that is coming from the military side is because the military has both worked in the region and trained in the region. So they are more realistic."

Islamists in the region are preparing for a reaction from the U.S.

"If America hits us, I promise you that we will multiply the Sept. 11 attack by 10," said Oumar Ould Hamaha, a spokesman for the Islamists in northern Mali, while denying that his group or Al Qaeda fighters based in Mali played a role in the Benghazi attack.

Finding the militants who overwhelmed a small security force at the consulate isn't going to be easy.

The key suspects are members of the Libyan militia group Ansar al-Shariah. The group has denied responsibility, but eyewitnesses saw Ansar fighters at the consulate, and U.S. intelligence intercepted phone calls after the attack from Ansar fighters to leaders of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, bragging about it. The affiliate's leaders are known to be mostly in northern Mali, where they have seized a territory as large as Texas following a coup in the country's capital.

But U.S. investigators have only loosely linked "one or two names" to the attack, and they lack proof that it was planned ahead of time, or that the local fighters had any help from the larger Al Qaeda affiliate, officials say.

If that proof is found, the White House must decide whether to ask Libyan security forces to arrest the suspects with an eye to extraditing them to the U.S. for trial, or to simply target the suspects with U.S. covert action.

U.S. officials say covert action is more likely. The FBI couldn't gain access to the consulate until weeks after the attack, so it is unlikely it will be able to build a strong criminal case. The U.S. is also leery of trusting the arrest and questioning of the suspects to the fledgling Libyan security forces and legal system still building after the overthrow of Moammar Gadhafi in 2011.

The burden of proof for U.S. covert action is far lower, but action by the CIA or special operations forces still requires a body of evidence that shows the suspect either took part in the violence or presents a "continuing and persistent, imminent threat" to U.S. targets, current and former officials said.

"If the people who were targeted were themselves directly complicit in this attack or directly affiliated with a group strongly implicated in the attack, then you can make an argument of imminence of threat," said Robert Grenier, former director of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center.

But if the U.S. acts alone to target them in Africa, " it raises all kinds of sovereignty issues ... and makes people very uncomfortable," said Grenier, who has criticized the CIA's heavy use of drones in Pakistan without that government's support.

Even a strike that happens with permission could prove problematic, especially in Libya or Mali where Al Qaeda supporters are currently based. Both countries have fragile, interim governments that could lose popular support if they are seen allowing the U.S. unfettered access to hunt Al Qaeda.

The Libyan government is so wary of the U.S. investigation expanding into unilateral action that it refused requests to arm the drones now being flown over Libya. Libyan officials have complained publicly that they were unaware of how large the U.S. intelligence presence was in Benghazi until a couple of dozen U.S. officials showed up at the airport after the attack, waiting to be evacuated — roughly twice the number of U.S. staff the Libyans thought were there. A number of those waiting to be evacuated worked for U.S. intelligence, according to two American officials.

In Mali, U.S. officials have urged the government to allow special operations trainers to return, to work with Mali's forces to push Al Qaeda out of that country's northern area. AQIM is among the groups that filled the power vacuum after a coup by rebellious Malian forces in March. U.S. special operations forces trainers left Mali just days after the coup. While such trainers have not been invited to return, the U.S. has expanded its intelligence effort on Mali, focusing satellite and spy flights over the contested northern region to track and map the militant groups vying for control of the territory, officials say.


Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/10/15/white-house-wrestles-with-how-where-to-strike-back-if-libya-consulate-attackers/#ixzz29fRyR07q

Monday, October 8, 2012

U.S. & French Military Deployments to the Middle East & North Africa

Curious U.S. and French Military Deployments

September 28, 2012 | 2008 GMT


Summary

Stratfor has received multiple reports of U.S. and French military movements that we would like to highlight to our readers. These movements could have multiple explanations and might not be linked. But given the numerous ongoing crises specifically centered in North Africa and the Middle East, we consider these developments to be worth following. 

Analysis 

According to a worldwide network of aircraft spotters and trackers, at least a dozen MC-130H, HC-130N, HC-130P and AC-130U military transport planes and gunships crossed the Atlantic Ocean on Sept. 13 heading eastbound. These aircraft are typically used for a variety of special tasks, including in close cooperation with special operations forces. The last reported stop for the aircraft was Souda Bay, Crete. It is unclear whether the aircraft have left Crete, but we are working on tracking them down. 




A week and a half later, on Sept. 24, the same network of aircraft spotters noted 12 U.S. Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornet fighter jets arriving in two waves at Moron air base in Spain. It is not known where the squadron is heading, though it could be en route to Afghanistan to reinforce elements there. The Harrier squadron that suffered heavy losses in the Sept. 14 attack on Camp Bastion has already been replaced by another Harrier unit, so it is unlikely that the squadron's deployment is directly linked to that event. It is also possible that the F/A-18s are heading to the Gulf Cooperation Council region. A number of air superiority squadrons, including an F-22 Raptor squadron, have already deployed to the region. If that is the case, the squadron is intended simply as reinforcements or replacements for assets currently deployed there. 

Also on Sept. 24, The New York Times published an article stating that Iraq and the United States were negotiating an agreement that could result in the return of small units of U.S. soldiers to Iraq on training missions. At the request of the Iraqi government, according to U.S. Gen. Robert Caslen, a unit of Army special operations soldiers was recently deployed to Iraq to advise on counterterrorism and to help with intelligence. It is possible that at least some of the MC-130 aircraft previously mentioned were delivering these special operations troops to Iraq. 

Another report on Sept. 24, this one by the Le Figaro French-language newspaper, said some 100 French special operations troops had been deployed in the sub-Saharan region to counteract militants in northern Mali. Le Figaro also reported that maritime patrol aircraft that can be used to collect intelligence will be deployed to the region and that commandos of the French navy will reinforce the French special operations troops. 


Finally, Italian journalist Guido Olimpio reported in September that U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles are currently tracking militants in Cyrenaica, the historical name for eastern Libya. He also said "reliable sources" had confirmed that U.S. special operations forces were planning to carry out intelligence operations that could be in preparation for surgical strikes in North Africa, including in Libya and in Mali. 

All these deployments could be previously scheduled movements for training or part of ongoing operations. They also do not necessarily mean any one mission is imminent. The United States and France could simply be positioning military assets in a region that is rife with conflict and that may eventually require rapid military intervention or action. 

Whatever the intent, these deployments, taken together, are too compelling to ignore. Given the fluid conflicts in North Africa, Syria and Afghanistan, as well as the current tensions with Iran, these movements and reports are important to highlight to our readers. 


http://www.stratfor.com


Friday, August 24, 2012

Targeting Tribal Leaders: A New Militant Tactic in Sinai

 
By Ashley Lindsey

Militants killed Egyptian tribal leader Khalaf al-Menahy and his son Aug. 13 as the two were returning from a conference in east Sinai organized and attended by tribal leaders to denounce militancy, according to Sinai security forces. The senior al-Menahy was a prominent proponent of bolstering the Sinai Peninsula's representation in Egypt's parliament and of improving security in the region. He also was a prominent sheikh in the Sawarka tribe, said to be the largest in Sinai. Following his burial Aug. 13, the tribe vowed to seek vengeance.

This is the first reported case of militants attacking tribal leaders in Sinai. It comes soon after an attack on Egyptian security forces Aug. 5 and an attack on military checkpoints in northern Sinai on Aug. 8.

Although the militant tactic of targeting tribal leaders is new to Sinai, the tactic has been common in conflict zones in the Middle East and South Asia, such as in Yemen, Iraq and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. Though it can offer many benefits to these militants -- including weakening the targeted tribe and possibly leading to its co-option -- these kinds of attacks tend to only succeed in zones with little government control and against tribes that cannot effectively retaliate. Examining similar instances of this tactic thus provides a helpful tool for assessing the consequences of attacks against tribal elements in the Sinai Peninsula.

A Widespread Militant Tactic

Yemen

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has operated openly in Yemen's tribal-dominated southern and eastern provinces for years. It has sought to expand its presence and operations by winning over local tribes using tactics such as strategic marriages.

Lately, it appears to have begun a shift from wooing tribal leaders to intimidating them. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula recently failed in an attempt to assassinate tribal leader Majed al-Dhahab in the city of Radda in Bayda province. An important tribal leader, al-Dhahab participated in the offensive to drive al Qaeda -- and his own cousin, a local al Qaeda leader -- from the region after the militant group seized control of Radda in January. Al-Dhahab's son received a package that unbeknownst to him contained a bomb, which he was instructed to give to his father. However, the package exploded in his arms Aug. 4 before he could deliver it. Immediately after his son's death, al-Dhahab received a call warning him that the group would kill anyone who opposed it.

The group followed up with another attack on tribal elements Aug. 5. A suicide bomber detonated an explosive device at a wake in Jaar, killing 45 people. The dead included several tribal fighters who had participated in the June Yemeni government offensive against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and the wounded included a tribal leader.

The region's tribes have not publicly vowed to retaliate against the militant group. If they are capable of doing so, they probably will respond to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's attacks. But the tribes could be too weak to mount an effective response, especially in the wake of attacks on their leadership structure. This could cause some tribesmen to abandon the fight, allowing militants to try to resume activity in the region's towns should they wish.

Iraq and the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border

Although new to Yemen, militants frequently used the tactic of attacking tribal leaders during the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The tactic is still frequently used, especially in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. In one significant instance, in 2007 al Qaeda in Iraq assassinated high-profile Sunni tribal Sheikh Abdul-Sattar Abu Risha, who led the Anbar Awakening Council. A U.S. ally, Abu Risha had formed the council, uniting dozens of Sunni tribes in the province against al Qaeda in Iraq. His killing backfired on the militant group, generating a massive outpouring of sympathy for Abu Risha and prompting the tribes in the province to join in vowing to fight al Qaeda in Iraq to the death.

In southern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban are deeply embedded into the tribal system. They have effectively used the tactic of assassinating tribal leaders to eliminate obstacles to their operations and evolution. To this end, they regularly employ suicide operations, armed assaults and roadside bombs against anti-Taliban militias known as lashkars and against tribal leaders in northwestern Pakistan.

One area particularly affected by such attacks is Bajaur, a Pakistani agency that borders Afghanistan's Kunar province. After numerous attacks on tribal leaders and members of peace committees in Bajaur, the Mamond tribe announced July 25 that the tribal leaders had formed a lashkar to prevent cross-border attacks. Hundreds of elders, leaders and religious figures of various subtribes and peace committees pledged their support for this militia. As with the killing of Abu Risha, the Afghan Taliban attacks on tribesmen and leadership in the region spurred a fiercely united response across numerous tribes, with the new militia even expressing a willingness to enter Afghanistan to attack Taliban leaders.

Upsides and Downsides of a Militant Tactic

Militant groups attack tribal leaders to increase their influence and area of operations. From the militants' perspective, removing a tribal leader ideally will weaken the targeted tribe. This could end the tribes' resistance and even lead to the its being co-opted by the militant group due to a leadership vacuum following the militant attack. The weakening of the tribe could leave the group no choice but to allow the militant group to operate unchallenged in its territory. Even though assassinated tribal leaders are replaced and the leadership structure remains intact, tribal leaders in the area could be persuaded to adopt a more accommodating stance on the presence of militants.

Success for a militant group in the long term happens under two conditions. First, the militants must be acting in an area with a tribal patronage network and limited government oversight. Without such a network, attacks on tribal leaders in efforts to co-opt and intimidate that tribe would not provide any significant gain. In Yemen, for example, the patronage and tribal network are very strong and in most cases enjoy greater legitimacy and power than the government. Attacks against tribal chiefs there are accordingly tantamount to attacks on the local government. On the one hand, that means tribal networks can band together and shun foreign militant elements as one community. On the other hand, if al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is able to coerce a tribe into aligning with it, the militant group will then enjoy access to that tribes' resources, will gain the ability to plan and launch attacks in that area, and could even gain better relations with neighboring tribes.

Second, the group must be militarily capable of overwhelming the targeted tribe and its allies or at least of gaining the upper hand. As can be seen from the Iraq example, killing Abu Risha backfired because his tribe was large, committed and militarily strong, and it had the support of several allied Sunni tribes that belonged to his Anbar Awakening Council.

The tactic of targeting a tribal leader thus comes with certain risks. When the aforementioned two conditions are not met, a militant group exposes itself to great danger when it targets tribal leaders.

Consequences of the Sinai Assassination

The Sinai Peninsula meets the requirement of limited government control and strong tribal networks. The question then becomes whether the Sinai tribes can muster a strong defense against the militants. In the coming weeks, it will be important to look for signs of the retaliation pledged by al-Menahy's Sawarka tribe and others allied with it. This retaliation could come in the form of attacks against the militants passing through Sawarka and its allied tribes' territory.


Tribal retaliation could also come in the less aggressive, yet still effective, form of supplying increased logistical support and intelligence to the Egyptian government. Increased weapons seizures and the arrest of key leaders suggest that tribal sources on the ground are providing intelligence to Cairo. A targeted campaign against the militants already has begun, with Egyptian planes bombing the mountains of El Arish on Aug. 15. The intelligence for these attacks likely came from local tribes.

The success of tribal and Egyptian security efforts against the militants will determine whether the militants miscalculated their position in Sinai when they attacked a key tribal leader. The resilience of militants in Sinai also will help determine whether they can continue to stage attacks against Egypt and Israel.


Read more: Targeting Tribal Leaders: A New Militant Tactic in Sinai | Stratfor