Palestinians Want US Dead But Want Our Money

Palestinians: We Hate You, So Please Pay Us More

by Khaled Abu Toameh
March 22, 2013 at 5:00 am

Many Arabs and Muslims hate the U.S. because it stands in the way of fulfilling their dream of destroying Israel. The strong sentiments against Israel and the U.S. are the direct result of decades of indoctrination and incitement.

The anti-US protests that erupted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip before and during President Barack Obama's serve as a reminder that many Palestinians continue to loathe the U.S., primarily because of its support for Israel.

But U.S. support for Israel is not the only reason why such a large number of Palestinians -- as well as Arabs and Muslims -- hate the Americans with such intensity.

Palestinians who took to the streets during the week to protest against Obama's visit chanted slogans not only against him personally, but also in denunciation of U.S. policies and actions toward the Arabs and Muslims.

In Ramallah, for instance, hundreds of Muslim fundamentalists chanted slogans condemning the U.S. for "perpetrating massacres and atrocities" against Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan.

"America is the number one enemy of Islam and Muslims," speakers at the anti-U.S. rally in Ramallah declared.

Palestinian Authority policemen, who are trained and funded by the U.S. and other Western countries, did not intervene even as the extremists also started criticizing the leaders of the Palestinian Authority for agreeing to meet with the "infidel" Obama.

Palestinian demonstrators in Bethlehem, who trampled on Obama's pictures and sprayed Nazi swastikas over them before setting them on fire, also explained that they were protesting not only against U.S. support for Israel, but also Washington's general attitude toward Arabs and Muslims.

"The Americans are the enemies of the Arabs and Muslims," shouted a Palestinian activist standing near Manger Square. "The Americans do only what the Jews tell them to do and that is why they are against all Arabs and Muslims."

The strong sentiments against Israel and the U.S. expressed by Palestinians are the direct result of decades of indoctrination and incitement.

Like the rest of the Arab and Islamic countries, Palestinians have been told that the U.S. is the "Great Satan" and number one enemy of all Arabs and Muslims.

read more at http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3637/palestinians-hate-us

Israel dismantles Palestinian 'Bab al-Shams' protest camp

Published March 24th, 2013 - 12:47 GMT via SyndiGate.info

A Palestinian flag flutters at a protest camp in the controversial West Bank area known as E1 located east of Jerusalem and near the Jewish settlement of Maaleh Adumim early on Sunday. Hundreds of Israeli police dismantled the protest camp on the outskirts of Jerusalem overnight, activists and police said. (Photo: AFP / Ahmad Gharabli).

Israel dismantled a Palestinian tent camp on Sunday, set up by activists protesting against Israel's plans to build a large settlement near East Jerusalem, Al Jazeera reports. 

Before dawn on Sunday, around 200 Israeli police officers removed some 40 demonstrators from the tent camp, which was set up during U.S. President Barack Obama's recent visit, police spokesman, Micky Rosenfeld, told the news site.

Activists set up the camp, named Bab al-Shams (Gate of the Sun), near the West Bank Israeli settlement of Maale Adumim, in an attempt to draw attention to Israeli plans to boost building in E1, a controversial corridor of land east of Jerusalem. 

Critics say that plans to build over 3,500 housing units in E1 would cut off the northern part of the West Bank from the south and would leave Palestinian areas of Jerusalem surrounded by a chain of Jewish ones, threatening the viability of a future Palestinian state. 

During his visit last week, Obama highlighted the E1 settlement as particularly problematic. 

One of the protest organizers, Palestinian legislator, Mustafa Barghouti, told AFP news agency by phone on Sunday that he and four others were arrested and taken for questioning at Maale Adumim police station.

He said around 50 other activists were put on buses and released in a Palestinian Authority-controlled part of the West Bank.
read more at http://www.albawaba.com/news/israel-settlements--479435

A Protester's Death Could Widen The Unrest In The Middle East.

The Gaza Conflict Reverberates in the West Bank and Jordan

November 19, 2012 | 1818 GMT

Summary
A Palestinian who was wounded Nov. 17 during protests in the West Bank against Israel's ongoing operations in the Gaza Strip has died from his injuries, the Palestinian Ma'an news agency reported Nov. 19. The West Bank has been calm in recent years, but significant protests have been taking place across the eastern Palestinian territory -- which is ruled by Hamas' secular rival, Fatah -- in response to Israel's Operation Pillar of Defense. The protester's death could widen that unrest. 

These developments have implications in Jordan, where the regime of King Abdullah II is also struggling with political unrest. The duration of the Israeli-Gaza conflict will determine the extent of the brewing unrest in the West Bank and the toll it has on Jordan. 

Analysis 
The ongoing conflict between Hamas and Israel has generated a significant amount of sympathy for Hamas in the West Bank. In some parts of the territory, anti-Israeli youth protesters have thrown stones and Molotov cocktails at Israeli security forces patrols. The protests, while at a low level for now, complicate matters for the administration of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. 

While the Arab Spring created conditions that increased the power of Hamas, it also added to the woes of Fatah, which has been deteriorating for some time. The group suffers from an aging leadership, internal splits, corruption charges amid poor economic conditions in the West Bank and a failure to make progress toward Palestinian statehood in negotiations. Thus, it is no surprise that Fatah, despite its deep animosity toward Hamas, has come out in support of its rival and in solidarity against Israel. Fatah likely chose not to interfere with the West Bank protests to avoid aggravating matters, but it cannot allow the protests to spiral out of control. 

Fatah is hoping that Hamas and Israel reach a truce as soon as possible. Indeed, the West Bank group is likely using its channels with the United States and Israel toward this end. Clearly, Fatah does not want protests in the West Bank to go from supporting Hamas and Gaza to turning against mismanagement in the West Bank. At the same time, this could be a reason why Hamas, which seeks a resurgence in the West Bank, would want to prolong the conflict somewhat. 

The stirring of turmoil in the West Bank is very worrisome for Jordan, which neighbors the Palestinian territory and is home to a large population of Palestinian heritage that harbors anti-Israeli sentiments. The ruling Hashemites do not want to see the Gaza issue spill over Jordan's borders and accentuate their own problems. 

Jordan's Problems 

The effects of the Arab Spring have not really manifested themselves in Jordan, but the kingdom has not been stable either. Since the outbreak of the regional unrest in early 2011, King Abdullah II has replaced three prime ministers in response to low-level but steady protests. The dilemma that the Hashemites face is that unrest has spread into the ranks of the tribal forces (aka East Bankers), who until recently have served as the bedrock of the monarchy's stability. At the same time, in urban areas, the country's largest political movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, has departed from its traditional role as the loyal opposition and begun demanding that the palace share power with parliament. 

Meanwhile, the economic situation in the country has deteriorated to the extent that the government was forced to cut fuel subsidies earlier this month. The public backlash to the rising energy costs has intensified the protests. In the early months of the Arab Spring, there were isolated cases of tribal youths chanting slogans against the Jordanian king and queen. Such instances of public criticism -- some even calling for the king to step down -- 
appear to be growing. 

Still, neither the rural-based tribal principals nor the urban-centered Brotherhood appear to be interested in trying to topple the monarchy. Indeed, both have made it clear that they do not wish to see unrest turn into anarchy. But the problem is that neither institution seems to have a monopoly over the protests; youth groups and other non-brand entities are driving some of the agitation. 

The Brotherhood, which has long called for the kingdom to cut ties with Israel, has once again raised this demand. Such calls have not gained traction in the past. But in the post-Arab Spring atmosphere -- and now with the conflict in Gaza -- the demand could become a tool for the Brotherhood to extract even greater concessions from the palace. Already, the king has been on the defensive, asking the Brotherhood to end its boycott of the political system and participate in upcoming parliamentary polls. Moreover, after restoring ties with Hamas earlier this year, the king has sought the mediation of Hamas chief Khaled Meshaal toward this end. 

It is too early to tell what domestic political gains the Brotherhood could obtain by leveraging the fighting in Gaza. But the king's persistently defensive approach could lead to apprehension within his camp about whether he has what it takes to steer the country out of its downward spiral. Any fissures within the ranks of the Hashemite state will lead only to greater instability. Over the longer term, instability in Jordan breeds the same in the West Bank, where the ruling Palestinian National Authority has been unable to resolve its own political problems. 
source: https://www.stratfor.com

Israel and Gaza: Then and Now

November 19, 2012

Four years ago on Nov. 4, while Americans were going to the polls to elect a new president, Israeli infantry, tanks and bulldozers entered the Gaza Strip to dismantle an extensive tunnel network used by Hamas to smuggle in weapons. An already tenuous truce mediated by the Egyptian government of Hosni Mubarak had been broken. Hamas responded with a barrage of mortar and rocket fire lasting several weeks, and on Dec. 27, 2008, Israel began Operation Cast Lead. The military campaign began with seven days of heavy air strikes on Gaza, followed by a 15-day ground incursion. By the end of the campaign, nearly 1,000 poorly guided shorter-range rockets and mortar shells hit southern Israel, reaching as far as Beersheba and Yavne. Several senior Hamas commanders and hundreds of militants were killed in the fighting. Israel Defense Forces figures showed that 10 IDF soldiers died (four from friendly fire), three Israeli civilians died from Palestinian rocket fire and 1,166 Palestinians were killed -- 709 of them combatants.

The strategic environment during the 2008-2009 Operation Cast Lead was vastly different from the one Israel faces in today's Operation Pillar of Defense. To understand the evolution in regional dynamics, we must return to 2006, the year that would set the conditions for both military campaigns.

Setting the Stage

2006 began with Hamas winning a sweeping electoral victory over its ideological rival, Fatah. Representing the secular and more pragmatic strand of Palestinian politics, Fatah had already been languishing in Gaza under the weight of its own corruption and its lackluster performance in seemingly fruitless negotiations with Israel. The political rise of Hamas led to months of civil war between the two Palestinian factions, and on June 14, Hamas forcibly took control of the Gaza Strip from Fatah. Just 11 days later, Hamas kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalt and killed two others, prompting a new round of hostilities with Israel. 

In what appeared to be a coordinated move, Hezbollah on July 12 launched its own raid on Israel's northern front and kidnapped two additional soldiers, kicking off the month-long Second Lebanon War. As Israel discovered, Hezbollah was well-prepared for the conflict, relying on an extensive tunneling system to preserve its launching crews and weaponry. Hezbollah made use of anti-tank guided missiles, improvised explosive devices that caught Israel Defense Forces by surprise and blunted the ground offensive, and medium-range rockets capable of reaching Haifa. Hezbollah incurred a heavy toll for the fight, with much of the infrastructure in southern Lebanon devastated and roughly 1,300 Lebanese civilian casualties threatening to erode its popular support. Casualty numbers aside, Hezbollah emerged from the 2006 conflict with a symbolic victory. Since 1973, no other Arab army, much less a militant organization, had been able to fight as effectively to challenge Israel's military superiority. Israel's inability to claim victory translated as a Hezbollah victory. That perception reverberated throughout the region. It cast doubts on Israel's ability to respond to much bigger strategic threats, considering it could be so confounded by a non-state militant actor close to home. 

At that time, Hamas was contending with numerous challenges; its coup in Gaza had earned the group severe political and economic isolation, and the group's appeals to open Gaza's border, and for neighbors to recognize Hamas as a legitimate political actor, went mostly unheeded. However, Hamas did take careful note of Hezbollah's example. Here was a militant organization that had burnished its resistance credentials against Israel, could maintain strong popular support among its constituents and had made its way into Lebanon's political mainstream. 

Hezbollah benefited from a strong patron in Iran. Hamas, on the other hand, enjoyed no such support. Mubarak's Egypt, Bashar al Assad's Syria, Jordan under the Hashemites and the Gulf monarchies under the influence of the House of Saud all shared a deep interest in keeping Hamas boxed in. Although publically these countries showed support for the Palestinians and condemned Israel, they tended to view Palestinian refugees and more radical groups such as Hamas as a threat to the stability of their regimes. 

While Hamas began questioning the benefits of its political experiment, Iran saw an opportunity to foster a militant proxy. Tehran saw an increasingly strained relationship between Saudi Arabia and Hamas, and it took advantage to increase funding and weapons supplies to the group. Forces from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force, along with Hezbollah, worked with Hamas to expand the group's weapons arsenal and build elaborate tunnels under the Gaza Strip to facilitate its operations. Israel soon began to notice and took action toward the end of 2008. 

Operation Cast Lead 

Hamas was operating in a difficult strategic environment during Operation Cast Lead. Hezbollah had the benefit of using the rural terrain south of the Litani River to launch rockets against Israel during the Second Lebanon War, thereby sparing Lebanon's most densely populated cities from retaliatory attacks. Hamas, on the other hand, must work in a tightly constricted geographic space and therefore uses the Palestinian population as cover for its rocket launches. The threat of losing popular support is therefore much higher for Hamas in Gaza than it is for Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. At the same time, operating in a built-up urban environment also poses a considerable challenge for the Israeli military. 

During Operation Cast Lead, Cairo did little to hide its true feelings toward Hamas. Though Egypt played a critical role in the cease-fire negotiations, it was prepared to incur the domestic political cost of cracking down on the Rafah border crossing to prevent refugees from flowing into Sinai and to prevent Hamas from replenishing its weapons supply. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, then in the opposition, took advantage of the situation to publicly rally against the Mubarak regime, but its protests did little to change the situation. Hamas was boxed in by Egypt and Israel. 

The rest of the region largely avoided direct involvement. Turkey was focused on internal affairs, and Saudi Arabia remained largely aloof. Jordan's Hashemite rulers could afford to continue quietly cooperating with Israel without facing backlash. The United States, emerging from an election, was focused on shaping an exit strategy from Iraq. Many of Hamas' traditional wealthy Gulf donors grew wary of attracting the focus of Western security and intelligence agencies as fund transfers from the Gulf came under closer scrutiny. 

Iran was the exception. While the Arab regimes ostracized Hamas, Iran worked to sustain the group in its fight. Tehran's reasoning was clear and related to Iran's emergence as a regional power. Iraq had already fallen into Iran's sphere of influence (though the United States was not yet prepared to admit it), Hezbollah was rebuilding in southern Lebanon, and Iranian influence continued to spread in western Afghanistan. Building up a stronger militant proxy network in the Palestinian territories was the logical next step in Tehran's effort to keep a check on Israeli threats to strike the Iranian nuclear program. 

In early January 2009, in the midst of Operation Cast Lead, Israel learned that Iran was allegedly planning to deliver 120 tons of arms and explosives to Gaza, including anti-tank guided missiles and Iranian-made Fajr-3 rockets with a 40-kilometer (25-mile) range and 45-kilogram (99-pound) warhead. The Iranian shipment arrived at Port Sudan, and the Israeli air force then bombed a large convoy of 23 trucks traveling across Egypt's southern border up into Sinai. Though Israel interdicted this weapons shipment -- likely with Egyptian complicity -- Iran did not give up its attempts to supply Hamas with advanced weaponry. The long-range Fajr rocket attacks targeting Tel Aviv and Jerusalem in the current conflict are a testament to Iran's continued effort.

The Current Geopolitical Environment 

Hamas and Israel now find themselves in a greatly altered geopolitical climate. On every one of its borders, Israel faces a growing set of vulnerabilities that would have been hard to envision at the time of Operation Cast Lead. 

The most important shift has taken place in Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood carefully used the momentum provided by the Arab Spring to shed its opposition status and take political control of the state. Hamas, which grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, then faced an important decision. With an ideological ally in Cairo, Egypt no longer presents as high a hurdle to Hamas' political ambitions. Indeed, Hamas could even try to use its ties to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to achieve political legitimacy. When unrest spread into Syria and began to threaten Iran's position in the Levant, Hamas made a strategic decision to move away from the Iran-Syria axis, now on the decline, and to latch itself onto the new apparent regional trend: the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist affiliates across the Arab world. 

This rise of the Muslim Brotherhood spread from Egypt to Syria to Jordan, presenting Israel with a new set of challenges on its borders. Egypt's dire economic situation, the political unrest in its cities, and the Muslim Brotherhood's uneasy relationship with the military and security apparatus led to a rapid deterioration in security in Sinai. Moreover, a Muslim Brotherhood government in Cairo on friendly terms with Hamas could not be trusted to crack down on the Gaza border and interdict major weapons shipments. A political machine such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which derives its power from the street, will be far more sensitive to pro-Palestinian sentiment than will a police state that can rule through intimidation. 

In Syria, Israel has lost a predictable adversary to its north. The balkanization of the Levant is giving rise to an array of Islamist forces, and Israel can no longer rely on the regime in Damascus to keep Hezbollah in check for its own interests. In trying to sustain its position in Syria and Lebanon, Iran has increased the number of its operatives in the region, bringing Tehran that much closer to Israel as both continue to posture over a potential strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. 

To Israel's east, across the Jordan River valley, pressure is also growing on the Hashemite kingdom. An emboldened Muslim Brotherhood has been joined by disillusioned tribes from the East Bank in openly calling for the downfall of the king. High energy costs are severely blunting the kingdom's ability to contain these protests through subsidies, and the growing crisis in Gaza threatens to spread instability in the West Bank and invigorate Palestinians across the river in Jordan. 

Beyond its immediate periphery, Israel is struggling to find parties interested in its cause. The Europeans remain hostile to anything they deem to be excessive Israeli retaliation against the Palestinians. Furthermore, they are far too consumed by the fragmentation of the European Union to get involved with what is happening in the southern Levant. 

The United States remains diplomatically involved in trying to reach a cease-fire, but as it has made clear throughout the Syrian crisis, Washington does not intend to get dragged into every conflagration in the Middle East. Instead, the United States is far more interested in having regional players like Egypt and Turkey manage the burden. The United States can pressure Egypt by threatening to withhold financial and military aid. In the case of Turkey, there appears to be little that Ankara can do to mediate the conflict. Turkish-Israeli relations have been severely strained since the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident. Moreover, although the Turkish government is trying to edge its way into the cease-fire negotiations to demonstrate its leadership prowess to the region, Ankara is as wary of appearing too close to a radical Islamist group like Hamas as it is of appearing in the Islamic world as too conciliatory to Israel. 

Saudi Arabia was already uncomfortable with backing more radical Palestinian strands, but Riyadh now faces a more critical threat -- the regional rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. Islamist political activism poses a direct threat to the foundation of the monarchy, which has steadfastly kept the religious establishment out of the political domain. Saudi Arabia has little interest in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood encouraging Hamas' political rise, and Riyadh will thus become even more alienated from the Palestinian theater. Meanwhile Gulf state Qatar, which has much less to lose, is proffering large amounts of financial aid in a bid to increase its influence in the Palestinian territories. 

Iran, meanwhile, is working feverishly to stem the decline of its regional influence. At the time of Operation Cast Lead, Iran was steadily expanding its sphere of influence, from western Afghanistan to the Mediterranean. A subsequent U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf and an intensifying U.S.-led economic warfare campaign slowed Iran down, but it was the decline of the al Assad regime that put Iran on the defensive. An emboldened Sunni opposition in Syria, backed by the West, Turkey and the Arab Gulf states, could spill into Lebanon to threaten Hezbollah's position and eventually threaten Iran's position in Iraq. With each faction looking to protect itself, Iran can no longer rely as heavily on militant proxies in the Levant, especially Palestinian groups that see an alignment with Iran as a liability in the face of a Sunni rebellion. But Iran is also not without options in trying to maintain a Palestinian lever against Israel. 

Hamas would not be able to strike Tel Aviv and Jerusalem with long-range rockets had it not been for Iran, which supplied these rockets through Sudan and trained Palestinian operatives on how to assemble them in Gaza. Even if Hamas uses up its arsenal of Fajr-5s in the current conflict and takes a heavy beating in the process, Iran has succeeded in creating a major regional distraction to tie down Israel and draw attention away from the Syrian rebellion. Iran supplied Hezbollah with Zelzal rockets capable of reaching Haifa during the 2006 Second Lebanon War. Hamas was limited to shorter-range Qassam and Grad rockets in Operation Cast Lead but now has Iranian-made Fajr-5s to target Israel's most cherished cities. 

Hamas is now carrying the mantle of resistance from Hezbollah in hopes of achieving a symbolic victory that does not end up devastating the group in Gaza. Israel's only hope to deny Hamas that victory is to eliminate Hamas' arsenal of these rockets, all the while knowing that Iran will likely continue to rely on Egypt's leniency on the border to smuggle more parts and weaponry into Gaza in the future. The Hamas rocket dilemma is just one example of the types of problems Israel will face in the coming years. The more vulnerable Israel becomes, the more prone it will be to pre-emptive action against its neighbors as it tries to pick the time and place of battle. In this complex strategic environment, Operation Pillar of Defense may be one of many similar military campaigns as Israel struggles to adjust to this new geopolitical reality. 

source: https://www.stratfor.com

A Pause for Negotiations in the Israeli-Hamas Conflict

November 18, 2012

By George Friedman

The Israeli-Hamas conflict has entered into a negotiation phase. Both sides want talks. Hamas wants them because any outcome that prevents an Israeli ground assault gives it the opportunity to retain some of its arsenal of Fajr-5 rockets; the Israelis want them because the cost of an invasion could be high, and they recall the political fallout of Operation Cast Lead in 2008, which alienated many European and other governments.

No matter how much either side might want to avoid ground warfare, negotiations are unlikely to forestall an Israeli assault because Hamas' and Israel's goals leave little middle ground.

One of Hamas' main goals in this current round of fighting is to retain enough Fajr-5 rockets to allow it to threaten the Israeli heartland, the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem corridor. If they succeed, Hamas will have gained a significant lever in its relations with the Israelis. The Israeli goal is to deny Hamas these rockets. The problem for the Israelis is that this requires a ground assault in order to have any chance of success. The Israelis may think they know where the rockets are, but they cannot be certain. Airstrikes can target known facilities, at least those where rockets are not stored in hardened underground bunkers. But only by going in on the ground with substantial force will the Israelis have the opportunity to search for and destroy the rockets.

Finding middle ground will be difficult. The retention of the Fajr-5 both dramatically improves Hamas' strategic position and gives Hamas the chance to further weaken the Palestinian National Authority. Hamas cannot agree to any deal that takes the rockets away -- or that does not at least leave open the possibility that it could have them. Meanwhile, Israel simply cannot live with the Fajr-5 in the hands of Hamas.

Lack of International Involvement

It is interesting to note the remarkable indifference of most countries that normally rush to mediate such disputes, the United States chief among them. Washington has essentially endorsed the Israeli position so strongly that it has no option to mediate. The Turks, who had been involved with the Gaza issue during the flotilla incident of May 2010, have taken no steps beyond rhetoric in spite of relations with both Hamas and Israel. The Saudis have also avoided getting involved.

The Egyptians have been the most active in trying to secure a cease-fire: Beyond sending their prime minister into Gaza on Nov. 16, as well as their intelligence chief and a group of security officials, Cairo then hosted a delegation of senior Hamas and Islamic Jihad members to further this goal. But while the Egyptians have a great interest in preventing an Israeli ground invasion of Gaza and are crucial to the Israeli imperative to prevent weapons smuggling via Gaza, there is little more they can do at present to mediate between the two sides.

If no one seems to want to serve as mediator, it is because there is such little room for negotiation. It is not ideology but strategy that locks each side into place. Hamas has come this far and does not want to give up what it has maneuvered for. Israel cannot allow Hamas a weapon that threatens the Israeli heartland. This situation is too serious for the parties to reach an agreement that ends the hostilities for now but in reality simply pushes back the issues to be addressed later. No one is eager to mediate a failure. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has said he will go to Gaza in the coming week, but he will not be in a position to find middle ground.

Israel will not budge on this. Hamas could be compelled to relent under threat from its core financial supporters in the Arabian Peninsula, but these states, such as Qatar, are all far more concerned with the threat posed by Iran. The fact that these rockets likely originated with Iran ought to give them incentive to lean on Hamas.

Dubious Prospects for Negotiations

It is important to bear in mind that the war is already under way. Israeli airstrikes are intense and continuous. Hamas is firing rockets at Israel. What has not yet happened is a direct ground attack on Gaza by the Israelis, although they have been mobilizing forces and should now be in a position to attack if they so choose. But the Israelis would much rather not attack. They fear the consequences -- measured both in human casualties and in political fallout -- that would certainly follow.

Thus, both sides want a negotiated end on terms that would leave the other side in an impossible position. While Hamas might be able to live with the status quo, Israel cannot. A negotiated end is therefore unlikely. Still, both sides are signaling their willingness to talk, and however forlorn the possibilities, there is a chance that something could be arranged.

We remain of the opinion that this current pause will be followed by a ground assault. Only by expanding the discussion beyond the Fajr-5 to a broader settlement of Hamas-Israeli issues could these negotiations succeed, but that would require Hamas recognizing Israel's right to exist and Israel accepting the equivalent of a Palestinian state run by Hamas in Gaza -- one that might spread its power to the West Bank. The more expansive the terms of these negotiations get, the more dubious their prospects for success -- and these negotiations start off fairly dubious as it is.

Read more: A Pause for Negotiations in the Israeli-Hamas Conflict | Stratfor 

Wrong Remedies

"Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it everywhere, diagnosing it incorrectly, and applying the wrong remedies." —Groucho Marx

Terror In Gaza X Three

Reported from CNN, a recording of Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is al Qaeda's deputy chief, vowing revenge for Israel's air and ground assault on Gaza. He calls the Jewish state's actions against Hamas "a gift" from U.S. President-elect Barack Obama.

With al Qaeda put into the mix, isn't this confirmation to the world that Hamas is, in fact, a terrorist organization?

What is the background for al-Zawahiri? According to Wikipedia, "Dr. Ayman Muhammad Rabaie al-Zawahiri...is a prominent leader of al-Qaeda, and was the second and last "emir" of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Al-Zawahiri is a qualified surgeon, and is an author of works including numerous al-Qaeda statements...Al-Zawahiri is under worldwide embargo by the UN 1267 Committee as a member or affiliate of al-Qaeda.In 1998 al-Zawahiri formally merged Egyptian Islamic Jihad into al-Qaeda...he has worked in the al-Qaeda organization since its inception and was a senior member of the group's shura council. He is often described as a "lieutenant" to Osama bin Laden, though bin Laden's chosen biographer has referred to him as the "real brains" of al-Qaeda.[5] As of July 2008, he is still at large."

In that same recording, al-Zawahiri states, "My Muslim brothers and mujahedeens in Gaza and all over Palestine, with the help of God we are with you in the battle, we will direct our strikes against the crusader Jewish coalition wherever we can."

What are mujahedeens? I wondered exactly that and decided to enlighten myself. Wikipedia states that mujahideen means "those engaged in jihad". Who does this include? "In its broadest sense, those Muslims who proclaim themselves warriors for the faith...has been used to refer to any Muslim groups engaged in hostilities with non-Muslims or even with secularized Muslim regimes."

With Hamas pretty much running the show in Gaza, and al-Qaeda a supporter of their efforts against Israel, Hezbolla has now gotten in the mix, and now there are at least three terrorist groups involved in the Gaza side of the conflict.

At least as early as December 28, 2008, FOX reported that "The leader of Lebanese militant Hezbollah said Sunday that he has asked his men to be on alert in southern Lebanon in case Israel attacks and promised not to abandon Hamas."

Reported January 6, 2009, by Asia Times reported that "The similarities between what is taking place in Gaza today, and what took place in Lebanon in 2006, are striking."

They also report some interesting facts about the two groups.

"Let us try to see the similarities between both groups, and what are the differences.

Similarities
Ideology: Both groups are governed by an Islamic ideology that dictates war against Israel as a national, moral and religious duty for believers. The warriors from both groups are not afraid to die. On the contrary, they seek it as a religious obligation in jihad (holy war). The IDF goes into battle with the objective of getting done with its duty, and returning home. They do not want to die.

Iran: Both are strongly allied to Iran, although Iranian support is stronger for Hamas than it is for Hezbollah. That explains why both are at odds with both Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which are engaged in a cold war with Tehran.

In 2006, Saudi Arabia was not pleased because of the war, because it further strengthened Iran's influence and clout in the Arab and Muslim world. This time, Egypt is frowning at Hamas' performance, especially that Nasrallah came out praising the leadership of Hamas, and came short of calling for a national uprising against the pro-American regime of President Hosni Mubarak. Hezbollah's victory in 2006 scored a point for Iran over Saudi Arabia. The same would apply with regard to Egypt if Hamas were to win the war in 2009.

Popularity: Both were voted in with an overwhelming majority in their respective countries and are more popular than their pro-Western counterparts within the Lebanese and Palestinian systems, Fouad al-Siniora and Mahmud Abbas. Decision-makers in Beirut and the West Bank are at a complete loss over what to do with Hamas and Hezbollah. Neither the Lebanese nor the Palestinian system has been able to disarm or weaken them. Nor has the United Nations or the United States. Both operate a wide network of charity and welfare organizations, including schools and hospitals, which makes them well rooted in Gaza and South Lebanon. Bombing them - or refusing to deal with them - will not make them go away.

Differences
Action: Hezbollah performed with flying military colors in 2006, surprising everyone with its strength, even the IDF. Arabs around the globe were enchanted when Hezbollah downed an Israeli warship - live during one of Nasrallah's speeches, or when he lived up to his promise and struck at Haifa, in the heart of Israel, for the first time since 1948.

Hezbollah projects itself as a resistance group that can deliver, psychologically through the media, and militarily in ground combat. It has a well-trained and professional army, with sophisticated missiles, radars and weapons. When its al-Manar TV was hit by Israel, the station stopped broadcasting for no more than a few minutes and was immediately back on air, beaming images of dead Israeli soldiers and victorious warriors from Hezbollah, along with talk-shows of Hezbollah's might, with subtitles in Hebrew.

Hamas also has none of Hezbollah's media machine to promote itself. During its heyday in the Palestinian uprising that started in 2000 (known in Arabic as intifada), it excelled at surprise explosions in crowded places within Israel, and target assassinations, not in professional warfare like Hezbollah. Hamas cannot duplicate Hezbollah's performance, it is that simple, and its targets are easy to strike at, within Gaza.

In South Lebanon, there are no military bases for Hezbollah, no visible training camps, or arms warehouses. No Hezbollah flags flying at official Hezbollah buildings, forcing Israel instead to strike at everyone and everything in Lebanon, hoping that in the mayhem they would succeed at hitting Hezbollah targets. As one journalist put it back then, "One walks through South Lebanon and feels Hezbollah, but one does not see Hezbollah."

The situation in Gaza is different. Hamas is everywhere. Caught by the trappings of state after it took control of Gaza in 2007, Hamas placed its name and hallmarks on all buildings it controls, making them easy targets for Israel."

It should be interesting as this fighting continues to see exactly who else comes out in support of Hamas. I am sure Amademajad will come out praising the Hamas efforts in one way or another soon. After all, he did say that Israel should be wiped off the face of the earth.

What do you think about the situation between Israel and the Gaza Strip? Who do you think is right in this conflict?

Hamas, Fatah, Israel, and the United Nations.

By now, I am sure you are aware of the conflict between Israel and Hamas. But, do you know who Hamas is, other than "the bad guy" in this conflict?

The name "Hamas" is an acronym for the "Islamic Resistance Movement". That says a lot on its own, however, let's look further into Hamas.

Hamas "is a Palestinian Sunni paramilitary organization and political party which holds a majority of seats in the elected legislative council of the Palestinian National Authority." Hamas was created in 1987 and has become popular in Palestinian society by establishing services such as hospitals, libraries, and others throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. "Hamas' charter calls for the destruction of the State of Israel and its replacement with a Palestinian Islamic state in the area that is now Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip". Note: source -- Wikipedia

The issues in the Palestinian government run deep and have a seemingly unending timeline. More recently, "The Palestinian National Authority was formed in 1994, pursuant to the Oslo Accords between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the government of Israel, as a 5-year interim body during which final status negotiations between the two parties were to take place but never did. According to the Accords, the Palestinian Authority was designated to have control over both security-related and civilian issues in Palestinian urban areas (referred to


as "Area A"), and only civilian control over Palestinian rural areas ("Area B"). The remainder of the territories, including Israeli settlements, the Jordan Valley region, and bypass roads between Palestinian communities, were to remain under exclusive Israeli control ("Area C"). East Jerusalem was excluded from the Accords." So, what needs to happen here, in addition to many other things, is that the negotiations need to be mandated and oversight by the United Nations must be in place as a peace making middle-man. Additionally, the Israeli settlements should currently remain theirs, according to the Oslo Accords. "The Oslo Accords, officially called the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements or Declaration of Principles (DOP) was a milestone in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was the first direct, face-to-face agreement between Israel and political representatives of Palestinians. It was the first time that some Palestinian factions publicly acknowledged Israel's right to exist."

On an international basis, the U.N. should use their power to intervene and uphold this agreement (the Oslo Accords), inclusive of the violence from Hamas and Hamas' power as a result of their victory in parliamentary elections. This is not a U.S. fight, although we are in need of standing up for our allies, which include Israel. However, this is a disturbance that the U.N. needs to pursue as an international peace keeping mission.

"The PA maintains an official uniformed armed service which various sources estimate to include anywhere from 40,000 to 80,000 recruits employing some armored cars, and a limited number carry automatic weapons. Officially termed a "police force", it violates the Oslo Accords which limit the force to 30,000 recruits."

Fatah is also a major political player in the Palastinian government. President Mahmoud Abbas a major player in the Fatah party. In the mid-1950's Abbas "became heavily involved in underground Palestinian politics, joining a number of exiled Palestinians in Qatar, where he was Director of Personnel in the emirate's Civil Service. While there, he recruited a number of people who would become key figures in the Palestine Liberation Organization, and was one of the founding members of Fatah in 1957. Yasser Arafat was among other key members...He (Abbas) is credited with initiating secretive contacts with left-wing and pacifist Jewish groups during the 1970s and 80s, and is considered by many to be a major architect of the 1993 Oslo peace accords (evidenced in part by the fact that he travelled with Arafat to the White House to sign the accords)."

The Palestinian terrorist organization called "Black September", responsible for the Munich massacre was assumed to be an operational cover for Arafat's Fatah group. "Abbas came into conflict with Palestinian militant groups, notably Islamic Jihad and Hamas; his pragmatic policies were opposed to their hard-line approach. However, he made it perfectly clear that he was forced to abandon, for the moment, the use of arms against Israeli civilians inside the green line due to its ineffectiveness; the Abbas doctrine allowed for selective terrorism."

"On December 16, 2006 Abbas called for new legislative elections, to bring an end to the parliamentary stalemate between Fatah and Hamas in forming a national unity government.

On March 17, 2007 a Palestinian unity government was formed incorporating members of both Hamas and Fatah, with Ismail Haniyeh as Prime Minister and independent politicians taking many key portfolios."

"... Ismail Haniyeh the Hamas prime minister has continued to operate in Gaza, and be recognized as by a large number of Palestinians as the legitimate caretaker prime minister. Anis al-Qasem, the Palestinian constitutional lawyer who drafted the Basic Law, is among those who publicly declared Abbas' appointment of Fayyad to be illegal."

You can infer from these statements that there is a power struggle that continues in the Palastinian government that does not have a simple answer. When there are two opposing terrorist-type groups, which is the lesser evil? When you have a choice between Hamas and Fatah groups, who do you want in charge? A message to the United Nations...it's pass time to intervene.