HARVARD GAZETTE ARCHIVES
North Korea could trigger 'nuclear cascade'
Experts discuss 'the world's most dangerous situation'
By Bob Brustman
Harvard News Office
Harvard News Office
What happens if North Korea becomes an acknowledged nuclear power? A "nuclear cascade" among the country's neighbors and the permanent erosion of the nuclear nonproliferation pact, according to Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government in the Kennedy School of Government, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and former U.S. assistant secretary of defense.
Allison joined Edward Baker, an associate at the Harvard-Yenching Institute, and Patrick Webb, former chief of nutrition for the UN World Food Programme, in a discussion titled "The World's Most Dangerous Situation: North Korea, Nukes, and U.S. Policy" on Feb. 16 at Harvard Law School.
READ MORE AT HARVARD
Opinion: “The Nuclear Cascade”
Will the edifice of non-proliferation hold? The next 12 months could be pivotal in determining the answer.
BOSTON — One has to admit he gave it his best shot. In his first year in office President Barack Obama fulfilled his campaign promise to reach out to Iran and attempt, if not quite a reconciliation, an honest try at resolving peripheral differences, and to open up a dialogue in which Iran and the United States could discuss their legitimate concerns and air their historic grievances. He gave the Iranians a year to either accept or reject his unclenched fist. That year is rapidly coming to a close, and Obama is no closer to his goal.
Whatever the outcome, Obama’s critics should always remember that the years of official hostility, the branding of Iran as an axis of evil, did nothing to modify Iran’s behavior. Indeed, it only strengthened Iran’s resolve to have a nuclear deterrent as the only way to forestall an American attack.
When Obama offered to turn the page with Iran he could not have foreseen the tumultuous and fraudulent Iranian election that spawned massive street demonstrations and a resistance that has shown a remarkable shelf life, given the repressive power of the state. Given the ongoing political crisis in Iran, it is unlikely that Iran can now enter into the kind of dialogue Obama was hoping for.
The goal, of course, is to dissuade Iran from making nuclear weapons. That may not be possible, given Iran’s nationalistic feelings and historic grievances, and the fact that the United States has armies on its eastern and western borders.
The best that the West can hope for is to persuade Iran that it should refrain from taking the last step of weaponization — i.e. the “last wire” theory in which Iran retains the capability of going nuclear but doesn’t take the final step of completion.
That is essentially what Japan has done, although the Japanese don’t talk about it. But should North Korea move toward more nuclear weapons than it has already developed, Japan could have their own bomb in a matter of days.
An Iranian bomb, it is feared, could cause what Harvard’s Graham Allison calls a “nuclear cascade” with many countries in the Middle East scrambling for bombs. Allison, the Paul Revere of nuclear proliferation, warns in the current issue of “Foreign Affairs” that there may have been talks already between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan about the sale or transfer of an “Islamic Bomb.” “In the 1980s, Saudi Arabia secretly purchased from China 36 CSS-2 missiles, which have a range of 1,500 miles and no plausible military use other than to carry nuclear weapons,” according to Allison.
Allison identifies “seven story lines” that are “advancing along crooked paths, each undermining the existing nuclear order.” They are:
- North Korea’s expanding weapons program
- Iran’s “nuclear ambitions"
- Pakistan’s increasing instability
- Al Qaeda’s enduring remnant
- Growing cynicism about the nonproliferation regime
- Nuclear energy’s renaissance
- New Lessons about the utility of nuclear weapons in international affairs
source: globalpost
Will the edifice of non-proliferation hold? The next 12 months could be pivotal in determining the answer.
BOSTON — One has to admit he gave it his best shot. In his first year in office President Barack Obama fulfilled his campaign promise to reach out to Iran and attempt, if not quite a reconciliation, an honest try at resolving peripheral differences, and to open up a dialogue in which Iran and the United States could discuss their legitimate concerns and air their historic grievances. He gave the Iranians a year to either accept or reject his unclenched fist. That year is rapidly coming to a close, and Obama is no closer to his goal.
Whatever the outcome, Obama’s critics should always remember that the years of official hostility, the branding of Iran as an axis of evil, did nothing to modify Iran’s behavior. Indeed, it only strengthened Iran’s resolve to have a nuclear deterrent as the only way to forestall an American attack.
When Obama offered to turn the page with Iran he could not have foreseen the tumultuous and fraudulent Iranian election that spawned massive street demonstrations and a resistance that has shown a remarkable shelf life, given the repressive power of the state. Given the ongoing political crisis in Iran, it is unlikely that Iran can now enter into the kind of dialogue Obama was hoping for.
The goal, of course, is to dissuade Iran from making nuclear weapons. That may not be possible, given Iran’s nationalistic feelings and historic grievances, and the fact that the United States has armies on its eastern and western borders.
The best that the West can hope for is to persuade Iran that it should refrain from taking the last step of weaponization — i.e. the “last wire” theory in which Iran retains the capability of going nuclear but doesn’t take the final step of completion.
That is essentially what Japan has done, although the Japanese don’t talk about it. But should North Korea move toward more nuclear weapons than it has already developed, Japan could have their own bomb in a matter of days.
An Iranian bomb, it is feared, could cause what Harvard’s Graham Allison calls a “nuclear cascade” with many countries in the Middle East scrambling for bombs. Allison, the Paul Revere of nuclear proliferation, warns in the current issue of “Foreign Affairs” that there may have been talks already between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan about the sale or transfer of an “Islamic Bomb.” “In the 1980s, Saudi Arabia secretly purchased from China 36 CSS-2 missiles, which have a range of 1,500 miles and no plausible military use other than to carry nuclear weapons,” according to Allison.
Allison identifies “seven story lines” that are “advancing along crooked paths, each undermining the existing nuclear order.” They are:
- North Korea’s expanding weapons program
- Iran’s “nuclear ambitions"
- Pakistan’s increasing instability
- Al Qaeda’s enduring remnant
- Growing cynicism about the nonproliferation regime
- Nuclear energy’s renaissance
- New Lessons about the utility of nuclear weapons in international affairs
source: globalpost
Saudi Arabia Seen Unlikely to Seek Nukes If Iran Gets One
February 20th, 2013 | by Jim Lobe
by Jim Lobe via IPS News Challenging what has become conventional wisdom here, a new report released here Tuesday by
Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the shadow of Iran
Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the shadow of Iran
At least thirteen countries throughout the greater Middle East have recently announced new or revived plans to explore civilian nuclear energy. They spoke of the need for energy diversification to meet growing electricity demand and the economic and environmental benefits of nuclear power. This surge of interest is consistent with a worldwide trend likened to a ‘nuclear renaissance’. Yet political factors also motivate the renewed interest in nuclear energy in the Middle East, including competition with Iran and concern about its determined pursuit of technologies that appear designed toprovide it with a nuclear weapons capability.
The IISS Strategic Dossier on nuclear programmes in the Middle East provides a comprehensive overview of the history of nuclear programmes in the region, an evaluation of national nuclear capabilities and policies, and an analysis of future aspirations. The fact-rich country profiles, which include Israel and Turkey, also assess how each state may react to an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. In addition to analyzing the proliferation risks inherent in the nuclear fuel cycle, the dossier assesses policy options, including possible regional arms control measures, that can help allow atomic energy to be harnessed for peaceful uses without engendering a ‘proliferation cascade’.
This Strategic Dossier was launched on 20 May 2008.
A live stream of the presentation and Q&A session is available.
The Iranian Nuclear Program: Timelines, Data, and Estimates V1.1
Iranian President Ahmadinejad visits the Natanz uranium enrichment facility on April 8, 2008. (Getty)
This assessment is version 1.1 of a recurring analysis of Iran’s nuclear program.
Iran is at the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability. Sanctions, direct action, and diplomatic tools have neither changed Iran’s nuclear policy nor had a visible effect on the enrichment program, including the growing stockpile of 19.75% LEU. Obtaining weapons-grade high-enriched uranium (HEU) is the most difficult and technically challenging obstacle to acquiring a nuclear weapon. Assessing the “breakout” time—the time required to convert low-enriched uranium (LEU) to weapons-grade HEU—is therefore a critical component of determining progress toward a nuclear weapons capability.
AEI's Critical Threats Project has produced a capabilities-assessment of the time required for Iran to acquire enough weapons-grade uranium to fuel one nuclear weapon if it proceeds to break out in 2012. It does not assess Iran’s intentions to weaponize or to purse break-out scenarios, but rather focuses entirely on technical feasibility. The assessment also provides scenarios for the growth of Iran’s 19.75% LEU stockpile, background data on processes involved in a nuclear weapons program and Iran’s reported progress, and imagery of the primary enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow.
This product is an exposition of the technical data contained in numerous International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports informed by the discussions of experts in the field of nuclear proliferation. It is a work in progress in that it will be revised continuously based on new information from the IAEA reports and other sources and on feedback from readers. We welcome your informed commentary on the technical considerations presented in this document. Please send your comments, with references to source-date or documentation, to INP@aei.org.
WORST-CASE SCENARIOS
Iran could acquire enough weapons-grade uranium for one weapon within one month of starting to race. This scenario is highly unlikely.
Assumptions:
- The worst-case scenarios assume that Iran devotes all operating centrifuges at Natanz to producing first 19.75% LEU and then 90% HEU, ceasing production of 3.5% LEU. Such actions would be visible to inspectors and so would most likely occur between inspections. Iranian nuclear policy and strategy does not appear to be going down this road.
- The scenarios assume 6,208 centrifuges spinning (the number being fed uranium as of November 18, 2011) operating with an efficiency of 0.9 separative work units (SWU)/centrifuge/year (roughly the efficiency they have demonstrated).
- Both worst-case scenarios assume that Iran begins to race to breakout on February 1, 2012.
- In the first case, producing 116kg of 19.75% LEU and then enriching directly to 90% HEU; in the second case, producing 243kg of 19.75% LEU, then enriching to 60% HEU and then to 90% HEU.
- These calculations assume tails assays of 2.0% and 9.3% for the two steps in the first process and 2.0%, 12.0%, and 41.1% for the three steps in the second process. These data are derived from the Natanz facility; the Fordow installations are notably more efficient with lower tails assays.
MOST LIKELY SCENARIOS
Iran can acquire weapons-grade uranium for one weapon by mid-August 2012 under currently-announced plans for expanding enrichment. This scenario is somewhat likely.
Iran will acquire enough 19.75% low-enriched uranium by June 1, 2012 to be within 2.5 months of producing weapons-grade uranium for one 15 kiloton bomb under certain contested technical assumptions. This scenario is the most likely.
Assumptions:
- The 6,208 centrifuges in the main cascade at Natanz continue to produce 3.5% LEU and are not diverted to higher-level enrichment.
- Enrichment to 19.75% occurs in four cascades totaling 676 IR-1 centrifuges (2 interconnected at the Natanz PFEP and 2 interconnected at Fordow).
- At least one additional cascade is brought online at Fordow by the end of March 2012, adding 164 IR-1 centrifuges.
- The scenarios also consider the possibility that Iran starts enriching with 1 cascade of IR-2 centrifuges (164 total) in June 2012 either at Natanz (where they are currently installed and under vacuum) or after moving them to Fordow. It adds another 2 cascades of IR-2 centrifuges (328 total) at Fordow in August 2012 and stops enriching at the 2 IR-1 cascades at the Natanz PFEP.
- Estimates for all three of these sub-scenarios are available on page 6 of the assessment.
- These calculations assume tails assays of 0.7% and 4.6% for the two steps. The difference in the tails between the scenarios reflects the fact that the cascades at PFEP and Fordow are interconnected.
Saudi Arabia Seen Unlikely to Seek Nukes If Iran Gets One
February 20th, 2013 | by Jim Lobe
by Jim Lobe via IPS News Challenging what has become conventional wisdom here, a new report released here Tuesday by
Saudi Arabia Seen Unlikely to Seek Nukes If Iran Gets One
February 20th, 2013 | by Jim Lobe
by Jim Lobe via IPS News Challenging what has become conventional wisdom here, a new report released here Tuesday by
Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the shadow of Iran
Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the shadow of Iran
At least thirteen countries throughout the greater Middle East have recently announced new or revived plans to explore civilian nuclear energy. They spoke of the need for energy diversification to meet growing electricity demand and the economic and environmental benefits of nuclear power. This surge of interest is consistent with a worldwide trend likened to a ‘nuclear renaissance’. Yet political factors also motivate the renewed interest in nuclear energy in the Middle East, including competition with Iran and concern about its determined pursuit of technologies that appear designed toprovide it with a nuclear weapons capability.
The IISS Strategic Dossier on nuclear programmes in the Middle East provides a comprehensive overview of the history of nuclear programmes in the region, an evaluation of national nuclear capabilities and policies, and an analysis of future aspirations. The fact-rich country profiles, which include Israel and Turkey, also assess how each state may react to an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. In addition to analyzing the proliferation risks inherent in the nuclear fuel cycle, the dossier assesses policy options, including possible regional arms control measures, that can help allow atomic energy to be harnessed for peaceful uses without engendering a ‘proliferation cascade’.
This Strategic Dossier was launched on 20 May 2008.
A live stream of the presentation and Q&A session is available.
The Iranian Nuclear Program: Timelines, Data, and Estimates V1.1
Iranian President Ahmadinejad visits the Natanz uranium enrichment facility on April 8, 2008. (Getty)
This assessment is version 1.1 of a recurring analysis of Iran’s nuclear program.
Iran is at the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability. Sanctions, direct action, and diplomatic tools have neither changed Iran’s nuclear policy nor had a visible effect on the enrichment program, including the growing stockpile of 19.75% LEU. Obtaining weapons-grade high-enriched uranium (HEU) is the most difficult and technically challenging obstacle to acquiring a nuclear weapon. Assessing the “breakout” time—the time required to convert low-enriched uranium (LEU) to weapons-grade HEU—is therefore a critical component of determining progress toward a nuclear weapons capability.
|
AEI's Critical Threats Project has produced a capabilities-assessment of the time required for Iran to acquire enough weapons-grade uranium to fuel one nuclear weapon if it proceeds to break out in 2012. It does not assess Iran’s intentions to weaponize or to purse break-out scenarios, but rather focuses entirely on technical feasibility. The assessment also provides scenarios for the growth of Iran’s 19.75% LEU stockpile, background data on processes involved in a nuclear weapons program and Iran’s reported progress, and imagery of the primary enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow.
This product is an exposition of the technical data contained in numerous International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports informed by the discussions of experts in the field of nuclear proliferation. It is a work in progress in that it will be revised continuously based on new information from the IAEA reports and other sources and on feedback from readers. We welcome your informed commentary on the technical considerations presented in this document. Please send your comments, with references to source-date or documentation, to INP@aei.org.
WORST-CASE SCENARIOS
Iran could acquire enough weapons-grade uranium for one weapon within one month of starting to race. This scenario is highly unlikely.
Assumptions:
- The worst-case scenarios assume that Iran devotes all operating centrifuges at Natanz to producing first 19.75% LEU and then 90% HEU, ceasing production of 3.5% LEU. Such actions would be visible to inspectors and so would most likely occur between inspections. Iranian nuclear policy and strategy does not appear to be going down this road.
- The scenarios assume 6,208 centrifuges spinning (the number being fed uranium as of November 18, 2011) operating with an efficiency of 0.9 separative work units (SWU)/centrifuge/year (roughly the efficiency they have demonstrated).
- Both worst-case scenarios assume that Iran begins to race to breakout on February 1, 2012.
- In the first case, producing 116kg of 19.75% LEU and then enriching directly to 90% HEU; in the second case, producing 243kg of 19.75% LEU, then enriching to 60% HEU and then to 90% HEU.
- These calculations assume tails assays of 2.0% and 9.3% for the two steps in the first process and 2.0%, 12.0%, and 41.1% for the three steps in the second process. These data are derived from the Natanz facility; the Fordow installations are notably more efficient with lower tails assays.
MOST LIKELY SCENARIOS
Iran can acquire weapons-grade uranium for one weapon by mid-August 2012 under currently-announced plans for expanding enrichment. This scenario is somewhat likely.
Iran will acquire enough 19.75% low-enriched uranium by June 1, 2012 to be within 2.5 months of producing weapons-grade uranium for one 15 kiloton bomb under certain contested technical assumptions. This scenario is the most likely.
Assumptions:
- The 6,208 centrifuges in the main cascade at Natanz continue to produce 3.5% LEU and are not diverted to higher-level enrichment.
- Enrichment to 19.75% occurs in four cascades totaling 676 IR-1 centrifuges (2 interconnected at the Natanz PFEP and 2 interconnected at Fordow).
- At least one additional cascade is brought online at Fordow by the end of March 2012, adding 164 IR-1 centrifuges.
- The scenarios also consider the possibility that Iran starts enriching with 1 cascade of IR-2 centrifuges (164 total) in June 2012 either at Natanz (where they are currently installed and under vacuum) or after moving them to Fordow. It adds another 2 cascades of IR-2 centrifuges (328 total) at Fordow in August 2012 and stops enriching at the 2 IR-1 cascades at the Natanz PFEP.
- Estimates for all three of these sub-scenarios are available on page 6 of the assessment.
- These calculations assume tails assays of 0.7% and 4.6% for the two steps. The difference in the tails between the scenarios reflects the fact that the cascades at PFEP and Fordow are interconnected.
Update on Jordan's nuclear program
An asset swap of uranium for reactors seems likely
 |
| Khaled Toukan JAEC |
The Jordanian Atomic Energy Agency has entered into negotiations with Areva and Rosatom to build 2 Gwe of nuclear powered electricity by 2020. Both firms are offering 1,000 MW reactors.
The Kingdom is likely to offer to pay for them with an asset swap from its uranium ore reserves said to be equal to 25,000 tonnes of yellowcake. However, opposition in Jordan's parliament may slow down closure of the deal. Currently, Jordan imports almost all of its electricity.
Late last April the government short listed both firms to running competitive negotiations in parallel. Rosatom is expected to offer its 1,000 MW VVER, a conventional PWR reactor which is its primary nuclear export. Areva is teaming with Mitsubishi to offer a new 1,000 MW reactor design expected to meet the needs of customers who don't want the more expensive 1,600 MW EPR. Jordanian government sources have told wire services they hope to sign with a vendor by the end of 2013 or sooner.
1-2-3 agreement a case of shadow boxing?
While no American firms are in the bidding, the U.S. has been holding diplomatic talks with Jordan to open its markets to American suppliers. Last January U.S. State Department officials dropped objections to Jordan building uranium enrichment facilities as a pre-condition for a 1-2-3 Agreement under the Atomic Energy Act.
Khaled Toukan, head of Jordan's Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) praised the change in U.S. policy. While he's happy about it, back in the U.S. republican members of Congress were critical of the move. Congress has to approve any 1-2-3 agreement before U.S. firms can sell equipment to Jordan.
The whole issue of whether Jordan wants to enrich uranium is a tempest in teapot - or a case of shadow boxing - take your pick. Areva has said that the primary value of the uranium is for export and not for development of fuel cycle facilities in Jordan.
Last December Areva shelved plans for massive capital expansion of its uranium facilities in France citing a soft market and a desire to fully utilize its new George Besse II enrichment plant in France. It has no incentive to build a competing site in Jordan having also shelved indefinitely breaking ground on the Eagle Rock Enrichment Plant in Idaho, US. (3 M SWU/yr)
The Kingdom is likely to offer to pay for them with an asset swap from its uranium ore reserves said to be equal to 25,000 tonnes of yellowcake. However, opposition in Jordan's parliament may slow down closure of the deal. Currently, Jordan imports almost all of its electricity.
Late last April the government short listed both firms to running competitive negotiations in parallel. Rosatom is expected to offer its 1,000 MW VVER, a conventional PWR reactor which is its primary nuclear export. Areva is teaming with Mitsubishi to offer a new 1,000 MW reactor design expected to meet the needs of customers who don't want the more expensive 1,600 MW EPR. Jordanian government sources have told wire services they hope to sign with a vendor by the end of 2013 or sooner.
1-2-3 agreement a case of shadow boxing?
While no American firms are in the bidding, the U.S. has been holding diplomatic talks with Jordan to open its markets to American suppliers. Last January U.S. State Department officials dropped objections to Jordan building uranium enrichment facilities as a pre-condition for a 1-2-3 Agreement under the Atomic Energy Act.
Khaled Toukan, head of Jordan's Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) praised the change in U.S. policy. While he's happy about it, back in the U.S. republican members of Congress were critical of the move. Congress has to approve any 1-2-3 agreement before U.S. firms can sell equipment to Jordan.
The whole issue of whether Jordan wants to enrich uranium is a tempest in teapot - or a case of shadow boxing - take your pick. Areva has said that the primary value of the uranium is for export and not for development of fuel cycle facilities in Jordan.Last December Areva shelved plans for massive capital expansion of its uranium facilities in France citing a soft market and a desire to fully utilize its new George Besse II enrichment plant in France. It has no incentive to build a competing site in Jordan having also shelved indefinitely breaking ground on the Eagle Rock Enrichment Plant in Idaho, US. (3 M SWU/yr)
read more atTHE ENERGY COLLECTIVE
Is The Nuclear Cascade Story in the Middle East Real?
Abstract
In the highly intricate conditions of current global security, the determination and assessment of where the international community is standing at the end of the NPT Review Conference related to the Middle East’s nuclear realities gains importance. For this reason, this paper aims to focus on two important questions. The first is related to the highly debated issue of whether there is any chance of a nuclear cascade becoming a reality in the Middle East assuming that the Iranian nuclear crisis is not been solved and remains in stalemate. The second question tries asks whether some members of the P-5’s new counter-proliferation attempts that are introduced to the Middle East region have any chance of working at all.
Key Words
Ballistic Missile, Extended Deterrence, Nuclear Proliferation, Security Guarantee, NPT, CTBT, FMCT, START, IAEA.
Introduction
In the last decade, two important issues, namely the deadlock in the Iranian nuclear crisis and the increasing demands for nuclear power reactors in the Middle East, have caused the most concern among the members of the nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Western powers have come to the conclusion that unless the international community finds an appropriate means of dealing with these two issues there will be a high probability of having a new wave of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. For this reason, Western capitals, so as to overcome their general non-proliferation concerns related to both the continuing Iranian crisis and the nuclear power plants demands all over the Middle East, have rapidly been trying to find ways of substituting indigenous procurement methods of the nuclear fuel that will be required for the new reactors. However, the international communities’ search for finding a way of formulating a regional or international nuclear fuel bank is a contentious issue from the perspective of the non-nuclear states of the NPT. This highly controversial situation has actually come to the fore as Western countries have tried to convince the nonnuclear states of the Middle East of the merits of not generating the nuclear fuel themselves. The Western capitals have tried to get the Middle Eastern nonnuclear states’ consent on this matter in two ways. First, Western states have encouraged the states of the Middle East to sign up to special nuclear cooperation agreements with the permanent five powers with nuclear weapons (the P5). The UAE has voluntarily decided to sign a nuclear energy exchange agreement, with the condition of not developing indigenous nuclear fuel on its territory.1 In return, the UAE was guaranteed to have the safe and secure supply of nuclear fuel.2 Second, in the face of some of the Middle Eastern non-nuclear states’ insistence on preserving their Article 4 NPT Treaty, rights of having civilian nuclear energy programs, the nuclear states have accepted this reality and they accordingly have decided to sign numerous nuclear exchange agreements with the non-nuclear states of the Middle East. However, some P5 countries have purposefully made new and strengthened measures of nonproliferation, including the well-known means in the NPT and the IAEA, compulsory in these agreements. The reason for this is of course related to the nuclear states’ general concerns of deterring a new tide of expected nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Since 2005, the Western states have strongly believed that the Tehran regime can become a potential nuclear proliferation driver in the Middle East due to its continuing nuclear enrichment program. They believe that this situation can only be avoided if Iran is persuaded to reverse its decision to enrich uranium. For this reason, they have tried to search for every possible method to persuade Iran to stop its program. Therefore, the nuclear powers in the NPT have introduced new models of nonproliferation to the Middle East region. But, at the same time the US, taking the lead of the P5, has decided to show that the nuclear-armed states of the NPT are more serious about meeting their disarmament obligations under Article 6 of the treaty.3 In this regard, Washington has launched several important initiatives, such as the “US Nuclear Posture Review” of 2010 and “Quadrennial Defense Review” of 2010, where the possibility of a reduced role for US nuclear weapons is mentioned.4 Since then, the Obama Administration has started discussing possible ways of restructuring the US’s security guarantee for the regions that are thought to be in need of it, namely the Middle East, Europe and Asia-Pacific. With this, US President Barack Obama’s new nuclear posture, symbolized by a “zero nuclear policy”,5 actually quite matches the current US strategy that involves both reviving nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation tracks. The START treaty signed in 2010 as well as the “New York Nuclear Security Summit” of 2010 and the “NPT Review Conference” of 2010 have all strongly confirmed this US decision. However, all of the US’s efforts in nuclear disarmament that have been initiated so far have not dealt with the important unresolved issues of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, such as the future of the CTBT and the FMCT among others. As a result, the challenges that lie ahead of the new START agreement are real and still need to be tackled, such as the future of missile defense and tactical nuclear weapons. All in all, the main rationale behind all of these American disarmament efforts that were launched have been related to the aim of creating a new and constructive image of a Washington government that is now sincere in meeting its obligations under Article 6 of the NPT.6 Within the complex and changing security environment of the 21st century, the old debate that is reminiscent of the days of the Cold War, namely “extended deterrence” and “re-assurance/assurance of Washington’s allies or friends in the The Obama Administration has given serious thought about the changing dynamics of regional security since these new nuclear aspirant states have come about. While Washington assesses the new dynamics, it has to take into account its new urgent task of extended deterrence in the post-Cold War era where it has deter the enemy as well as assure US allies as well as friends and partners. References to this challenging mission can be found in most of the important US security and defense documents, where an emphasis is placed both on attaining the conditions of a safe, secure and credible US nuclear deterrence capability as well as on strengthening the regional security architectures through available means. In this regard, the government in Washington has in particular devoted the most attention to the regions where there are new and old security concerns, including the Middle East. The main reason for the initiatives mentioned in American national security documents is actually associated with the current government’s perceived security concerns related to the changing dynamics of the 21st century. These new American security concerns, which are very clearly detailed in the “Nuclear Posture Review” of 2010,8 have also helped in determining the future road map of the US’s nuclear stance. Hence, it would be very beneficial at this point to highlight the Obama Administration’s four basic concerns related to regional security structures, including the Middle East, as evaluated from the perspective of the US’s nuclear posture in 2010: (i) Middle East or elsewhere”, has certainly gained in importance.7 And this situation consequently introduced a new and lively debate among foreign and security policy practioners as well as among IR academics. the first concern is regional and global nuclear proliferation and disarmament anxieties; (ii) the second concern is associated the US’s aim of realizing the deterrence of potential and future nuclear rivalries at global and regional levels; (iii) the third concern is related to assuring Washington’s allies, friends and partners of the US’s role in extended deterrence in different regional security issues; (iv) and, finally, the last concern is related to Washington’s new objective of reviving and if possibly strengthening the traditional non-proliferation regimes. Washington, so as accomplish these ambitious nuclear objectives, has highlighted the importance of attaining and maintaining different capabilities and strategies as options. Under current conditions, it has been stated that the new US nuclear posture would involve situations, such as in the Middle East, in which the US might felt obliged to use all available means of extended deterrence, while in other places there may not be such a need. The introduction of ballistic missile defense and other American non-nuclear capabilities as other countermeasures as part of the US’s extended deterrence in certain regions has surely accelerated the already heated debates about the current credibility of the American security guarantees in such places as the Middle East, Asia-Pacific and Europe. Under the current global security environment, the determination and assessment of where the international community was standing at the end of the NPT Review Conference of May 2010,9 which was related to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, becomes important. For this reason, this paper focuses on two very important questions. The first question is related to the highly debated issue of whether there is any chance of the so-called nuclear cascade becoming a reality within the current conditions of the Middle East assuming that the Iranian nuclear crisis is not solved or remains in stalemate. The second question looks at whether some of the P5’s new counterproliferation measures in the Middle East region have any chance of success in the light of US President Obama’s “zero nuclear weapons” policy. This is why this paper focuses on the general Western concerns of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.
SOURCE: SAM.GOV
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